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Updates from the Courts 
U.S. Supreme Court 
Criminal Law & Procedure 
DAVID SHINN, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. GEORGE RUSSELL KAYER    
DECIDED: December 14, 2020 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-1302_8nj9.pdf  
“The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) restricts the power of federal courts to grant writs 
of habeas corpus based on claims that were “adjudicated on the merits” by a state court. 28 U. S. C. §2254(d). When a 
state court has applied clearly established federal law to reasonably determined facts in the process of adjudicating a 
claim on the merits, a federal habeas court may not disturb the state court’s decision unless its error lies “beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 103 (2011). In this case, the Court of 
Appeals erred in ordering issuance of a writ of habeas corpus despite ample room for reasonable disagreement about 
the prisoner’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. In so doing, the Court of Appeals clearly violated this Court’s 
AEDPA jurisprudence. We therefore grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the judgment below.” 
UNITED STATES v. BRIGGS                                        DECIDED: December 10, 2020 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-108_8njq.pdf  
“The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) has long provided that a military offense, “punishable by death, may be 
tried and punished at any time without limitation.” 10 U. S. C. §843(a). Other military offenses are subject to a 5-year 
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statute of limitations. §843(b). Respondents are three military service members, each convicted of rape. When they 
were charged, the UCMJ provided that rape could be “punished by death.” §920(a) (1994 ed.). Because this Court held 
that the Eighth Amendment forbids a death sentence for the rape of an adult woman, Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 
respondents argue that they could not, in fact, have been sentenced to death, and therefore the UCMJ’s 5-year statute 
of limitations applies and bars their convictions. Agreeing, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces set aside their 
convictions.  
Held: Respondents’ prosecutions for rape under the UCMJ were timely. Pp. 2–9.  
(a) Respondents contend that the UCMJ phrase “punishable by death” means capable of punishment by death when all 
applicable law is taken into account. By contrast, the Government sees the phrase as something of a term of art, 
meaning capable of punishment by death under the penalty provisions of the UCMJ. Pp. 2–3.  
(b) For three reasons, the phrase’s context—appearing in a statute of limitations provision for prosecutions under the 
UCMJ—weighs heavily in favor of the Government’s interpretation. Pp. 3–9.  
(1) First, the UCMJ is a uniform code. As such, a natural referent for a statute of limitations provision within the 
UCMJ is other law in the UCMJ itself. The most natural place to look for Congress’s answer to whether rape was 
“punishable by death” within the meaning of §843(a) is §920’s directive that rape could be “punished by death.” That is 
so even if the UCMJ’s separate prohibition on “cruel or unusual punishment,” §855, would have been held to provide an 
independent defense against the imposition of the death penalty for rape. Pp. 3–4.  
(2) Second, respondents’ interpretation of §843(a) is not the sort of limitations provision that Congress is likely 
to have chosen. Statutes of limitations typically provide clarity, see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U. S. 783, 789, and it is 
reasonable to presume that clarity is an objective when lawmakers enact such provisions. But if “punishable by death” 
means punishable by death after all applicable law is taken into account, the deadline for filing rape charges would be 
unclear. That deadline would depend on an unresolved constitutional question about Coker’s application to military 
prosecutions, on what this Court has described as “‘evolving standards of decency’” under the Eighth Amendment, 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S. 407, 419, and on whether §855 of the UCMJ independently prohibits a death sentence 
for rape. Pp. 4–7.  
(3) Third, the ends served by statutes of limitations differ sharply from those served by provisions like the 
Eighth Amendment or UCMJ §855. Factors legislators may find important in setting a statute of limitations—such as the 
difficulty of gathering evidence and mounting a prosecution—play no part in the Court’s Eighth Amendment analysis. 
Thus, it is unlikely that lawmakers would want to tie a statute of limitations to judicial interpretations of such 
provisions. Pp. 8–9. No. 19–108, 78 M. J. 289; No. 19–184, 78 M. J. 415 (first judgment) and 79 M. J. 199 (second 
judgment), reversed and remanded.” 
PA Supreme Court 
Criminal Law & Procedure 
FRANCIS G. GRAHAM v. LARRY CHECK                                      DECIDED: December 22, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-22-2020mo%20-%20104639799122436919.pdf?cb=1  
“Pennsylvania tort law recognizes that sometimes injurious accidents are not caused by carelessness, but because 
events conspire to create a situation so urgent and unexpected that the person alleged to be blameworthy had little or 
no practical opportunity to avert the harm. When the evidence suggests that such “sudden emergencies” may have 
played a role in a case, the presiding judge may instruct a jury that, should it determine that such an emergency 
contributed to the accident, it should assess the defendant’s performance commensurately. But since the advent of the 
automobile, Pennsylvania law also has imposed a heightened standard of care upon drivers to exercise particular 
vigilance when it is reasonably foreseeable that a pedestrian will cross their path, particularly at intersections. The case 
now before us involves such a scenario. Citing darkness, an obstructed view, and a want of evidence of any overtly 
careless behavior by the driver, the trial court in this case charged the jury on sudden emergency— the pedestrian’s 
ostensibly abrupt appearance in front of the driver mere moments before impact. We hold that the trial evidence failed 
to establish a foundation for that instruction here. The decision to charge the jury on sudden emergency was prejudicial 
error in this case, and the plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MICHAEL A. LEHMAN; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. 
SCOTT CHARLES DAVIS                                        DECIDED: December 22, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-43A-2020mo%20-%20104639418122396143.pdf?cb=1  
“We granted discretionary review in these consolidated appeals to determine whether the costs of resentencing a 
criminal defendant may be recovered by the district attorney from the defendant, when resentencing became 
necessary because the original sentence was vacated upon a subsequent judicial determination the sentence was 
unconstitutional. Both lower tribunals correctly determined such costs may not be charged to the defendant, and we 
therefore affirm the decisions of the Superior Court.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MITCHELL GREGORY PECK, JR.   DECIDED: December 22, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-54-2020mo%20-%20104639959122546110.pdf?cb=1  
“Mitchell Gregory Peck, Jr. (“Peck”) was convicted of drug delivery resulting in death pursuant to Section 2506 of the 
Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2506 (“DDRD”), and sentenced to twenty to forty years of imprisonment. In this appeal, we 
consider the interplay between the territorial application of the Crimes Code, including in particular Section 102, 18 
Pa.C.S. § 102, and the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. Specific to this appeal, we address whether 
Peck’s conviction was supported by sufficient evidence where the drug delivery occurred in Maryland and the resulting 
death occurred in Pennsylvania. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that while the Commonwealth had subject 
matter jurisdiction to prosecute Peck for DDRD, it could not present evidence to support his conviction. We therefore 
reverse the Superior Court’s decision to the contrary and vacate Peck’s judgment of sentence.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. KEITH ALEXANDER                  DECIDED: December 22, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-51-2020mo%20-%20104639940122582972.pdf?cb=1  
“We granted Appellant Keith Alexander (“Alexander”)’s petition for allowance of appeal asking this Court to overrule or 
limit Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (OAJC), a plurality result announcing that, without limitation, the 
federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
applies in Pennsylvania. The United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence “recognizes the 
exception in a categorical manner and the lawfulness of the search ‘do[es] not require an assessment of whether the 
policy justifications underlying the exception, which may include exigency-based considerations, are implicated in a 
particular case.’” Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 150 n.3 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569–70 (1991)). 
What Gary did not settle is whether the federal automobile exception is consistent with Article I, Section 8 of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution. We have accepted the current appeal to answer that question. For the reasons discussed in 
this opinion, we hold that Article I, Section 8 affords greater protection to our citizens than the Fourth Amendment, and 
reaffirm our prior decisions: the Pennsylvania Constitution requires both a showing of probable cause and exigent 
circumstances to justify a warrantless search of an automobile.” 
PA Superior Court 
(Reporting only cases with precedential value) 
Criminal Law & Procedure 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JOSEPH A. MCCONNELL                    FILED: December 30, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A29037-20o%20-%20104648113124096630.pdf?cb=1  
“Appellant, Joseph A. McConnell appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of the 
summary offense of disorderly conduct. We affirm.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. GRACE L. LAMBERT                     FILED: December 24, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A20001-20o%20-%20104644002123816503.pdf?cb=1  
“The Commonwealth appeals from the February 5, 2020 order granting Appellee Grace L. Lambert’s omnibus pretrial 
motion for a writ of habeas corpus and dismissing all of the charges. We affirm.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. SHAUN KARL GIVEN                    FILED: December 23, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S31029-20o%20-%20104642983123762999.pdf?cb=1  
“Appellant, Shaun Karl Given, appeals from the March 27, 2019 Judgment of Sentence following his non-jury conviction 
of two counts of Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) – Controlled Substance and one count of Driving Under 
Suspension (“DUS”). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence to convict him of DUI and 
requests that this Court vacate his sentence for DUS. After careful review, we affirm Appellant’s convictions but vacate 
the Judgment of Sentence for DUI-Controlled Substance under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1)(iii).” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. EVAN D. BALLARD                      FILED: December 22, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S24012-20o.pdf?cb=2  
“Evan D. Ballard (Appellant) appeals from the August 5, 2019 judgment of sentence of one year of probation, imposed 
after he was convicted of access device fraud, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4106(a)(3), and identity theft, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4120(a). Appellant 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. After review, we reverse the judgment of sentence 
following his conviction for identity theft and affirm the judgment of sentence following his conviction for access device 
fraud.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NASEEMA SAMI                       FILED: December 22, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A26038-20o%20-%20104641021123497270.pdf?cb=1  
“The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County 
denying the Commonwealth’s motion in limine seeking to introduce prior bad act evidence in the prosecution of 
Appellee Naseema Sami (“Sami”) in her upcoming double murder trial. The trial court’s order prohibits the 
Commonwealth from presenting or attempting to elicit evidence regarding Sami’s possession or use of any drug other 
than marijuana. The Commonwealth has certified that the trial court’s ruling will terminate or substantially handicap 
the prosecution. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). After careful review, we affirm the trial court’s order.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. PHIL LEONE                                       FILED: December 21, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S26037-18o%20-%20104639706122413073.pdf?cb=1  
“This matter is before us on remand from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for reconsideration of our prior holding 
vacating that portion of the trial court’s June 5, 2017, Order finding Appellant Phil Leone to be a sexually violent 
predator (“SVP”) based on Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) and Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 
1212 (Pa.Super. 2017) in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972 (Pa. March 26, 
2020).  
Appellant previously had filed with this Court an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Northampton County on June 5, 2017, following his convictions of Involuntary Deviate Sexual 
Intercourse with a child (IDSI) and related offenses.  At that time, Appellant raised nine questions for our consideration.  
After review, we vacated the portion of Appellant's sentence requiring him to comply with SORNA, affirmed in all other 
respects, and remanded for further proceedings with regard to the SORNA issues to determine what, if any, 
registration requirements apply to Appellant. See Commonwealth v. Leone, No. 3307 EDA 2017 unpublished 
memorandum at * 1-31 (Pa.Super. filed Nov. 6, 2018).” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. SHAHEED SMITH                       FILED: December 21, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S48037-20o%20-%20104639664122410141.pdf?cb=1  
“Shaheed Smith (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas 
dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), seeking collateral relief from his jury 
convictions of aggravated assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, possession of an instrument of crime (PIC), and three 
counts of criminal conspiracy. On appeal, Appellant argues the PCRA court erred in failing to conduct a hearing on his 
claims involving the ineffectiveness of all prior counsel. Because we conclude the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to 
consider Appellant’s petition before his judgment of sentence became final, we are constrained to quash this appeal.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. PHILLIP ANDREW ASHER                   FILED: December 21, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S25001-20o%20-%20104639617122407581.pdf?cb=1  
“Phillip Andrew Asher appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne 
County, following his conviction of 500 counts of child pornography, seven counts of dissemination of photographs/film 
of child sex acts, and four counts of criminal use of a communication facility. After careful review, we vacate the order 
denying Asher’s post-sentence motion and remand in accordance with our Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020). Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of sentence.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MARK ANTHONY 
CARLSON                                                FILED: December 21, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S43020-20o%20-%20104639323122389116.pdf?cb=1  
“Appellant Mark Anthony Carlson appeals from the November 21, 2019 judgment of sentence entered in the Court of 
Common Pleas of McKean County (“trial court”), following his jury convictions for strangulation, aggravated assault, 
two counts of terroristic threats, simple assault, three counts of recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”), and 
harassment. Upon review, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand for further proceedings.” 
“In sum, based upon our review of the record, we find that Appellant’s constitutional right to counsel was violated 
numerous times at some of the most critical stages of this criminal proceeding—trial and sentencing—because the trial 
court failed to determine on the record whether Appellant was entitled to appointed counsel. Given the trial court’s 
numerous failures to protect Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Appellant was compelled to appear pro se 
at trial, where, as the trial transcript reveals, Appellant remained reluctantly silent. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s 
judgment of sentence and remand this matter, consistent with this Opinion, for a new trial where the trial court shall 
first take all necessary and required steps to ensure that Appellant’s right to counsel is protected. Should the trial court 
determine Appellant is not entitled to appointed counsel, it shall state so on the record with appropriate findings of fact 
supported by an evidentiary record.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MICHAEL D. DONOUGHE              FILED: December 18, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S49043-20o.pdf?cb=2  
“Appellant, Michael D. Donoughe, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Westmoreland County, which, sitting as finder of fact in his non-jury trial, found him guilty of both counts of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance (“DUI”), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1), and (a)(2), and one count of 
summary Maximum Speed Limits, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3362(a)(2). Herein, Appellant contends the court erred in denying his 
pretrial Motion to Dismiss raising a Brady claim centered on failure of the Pennsylvania State Police to preserve a 
Mobile Video Recording (“MVR”) of Appellant’s traffic stop, and he raises a challenge to the sufficiency of DUI-General 
Impairment evidence. We affirm.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ADAM MICHAEL RESLINK                  FILED: December 18, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S21008-20o%20-%20104638268122308207.pdf?cb=1  
“Adam Michael Reslink appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. 
After careful review, we affirm.” 
“Here, Reslink did not raise these claims before the trial court, in a motion to bar application of SORNA, or in post-
sentence motions. Rather, Reslink raises these claims for the first time on appeal. We, therefore, are constrained to find 
that Reslink has waived these claims. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). No relief is due.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CHARLES FLOYD                       FILED: December 16, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S54035-19o%20-%20104635970122165799.pdf?cb=1  
“Appellant, Charles Floyd, has appealed from two Judgments of Sentence entered in the Dauphin County Court of 
Common Pleas, one entered after Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to Possession with Intent to Deliver 
(“PWID”), Criminal Use of a Communication Facility, and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and the other entered 
following the consequent revocation of Appellant’s sentence of intermediate punishment (“IP”) imposed for a prior 
conviction. On January 4, 2019, Appellant timely filed one Notice of Appeal listing both lower court docket numbers. 
We conclude that because the trial court did not inform Appellant of his appellate rights as required by our rules of 
criminal procedure, a breakdown in the operation of the court as discussed in Commonwealth v. Larkin, A.3d , 2020 PA 
Super 163, at *3 (Pa. Super. filed July 9, 2020) (en banc) occurred. Thus, we decline to quash this appeal based on 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa. 2018).  
Additionally, with this appeal, Appellant’s counsel, James J. Karl, Esquire, seeks to withdraw from representing 
Appellant pursuant to Anders. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible 
error by failing to provide appropriate waiver-of-counsel colloquies before allowing Appellant to proceed pro se at each 
critical stage of the proceeding. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s guilty plea, vacate Appellant’s Judgments of 
Sentence, deny counsel’s Application for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, and remand for further proceedings.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. EDWARD FRIEDLAND                    FILED: December 11, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S45020-20o%20-%20104631599121851993.pdf?cb=1  
“Edward Friedland appeals from the order denying his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. 42 
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.” 
“In sum, because the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Friedland’s request for counsel to assist him in 
re-litigating this matter before the PCRA court, we affirm its order denying him post-conviction relief.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. GARY FRAME                        FILED: December 11, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S49039-20o%20-%20104632008121880346.pdf?cb=1  
“Appellant, Gary Frame, appeals from the order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County dismissing his 
petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541- 9546, as 
untimely. He contends his PCRA petition, filed 31 years after his judgment of sentence became final, qualifies for an 
exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements that vests the PCRA court with jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. After 
careful review, we find Appellant’s argument is at odds with a recent precedential decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, and for that reason, we affirm.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. BERTRAND GBOKO                           FILED: December 10, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S46042-20o%20-%20104630454121756629.pdf?cb=1  
“Bertrand Gboko (“Gboko”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of recklessly 
endangering another person and possession of an instrument of crime. We affirm.” 
“The trial court stated in its Opinion that the parties stipulated that Gboko is a peaceful and law-abiding person. Trial 
Court Opinion, 6/29/20, at 1 (unnumbered). Our review of the record confirms that, initially, defense counsel intended 
for at least three of Gboko’s character witnesses to testify at trial. See N.T., 8/20/19, at 88. However, following 
subsequent discussion, defense counsel agreed to stipulate that each of Gboko’s character witnesses would testify that 
Gboko is a peaceful and law-abiding person. See N.T., 8/20/19, at 93 (wherein defense counsel stated, “there’s been an 
[sic] stipulation by and between counsel….”). Additionally, the trial court had the opportunity to speak with each of 
Gboko’s character witnesses, and to learn the nature of each witness’s relationship to Gboko. See id. at 89-93. Defense 
counsel objected only after the Commonwealth stated it would not agree to stipulate to Gboko’s truthfulness, and the 
trial court agreed that such stipulation would not be appropriate. See id. at 96. Thus, Gboko’s claim that the trial court 
prevented him from presenting character witnesses is belied by the record. 
Moreover, truthfulness is not relevant to the offenses of recklessly endangering another person or possession of an 
instrument of crime. Additionally, Gboko testified on his own behalf at trial, and the Commonwealth did not attack 
Gboko’s general reputation for truthfulness. See Kennedy, supra; see also id. (stating that “when truthfulness is not 
relevant to the underlying criminal offense, a defendant may only call witnesses to testify as to his or her truthfulness 
when (a) he or she chooses to testify on his or her own behalf, and (b) the Commonwealth attacks the defendant’s 
truthfulness through either cross-examination or by other witness’ testimony.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, Gboko 
was not entitled to a stipulation regarding his character for truthfulness, nor was he entitled to introduce such evidence 
under either Rule 404 or Rule 608.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JAMES HAWKINS                            FILED: December 10, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A20025-20o%20-%20104630485121761167.pdf?cb=1  
“Appellant, James Hawkins, appeals from the order entered on September 16, 2019, which denied his petition filed 
under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.” 
“This is not a case where the police observed a scar, with the initial injury having been inflicted years ago. Rather, in this 
case, Officer Abel observed bruising, which is temporary in nature, from an attack that occurred one or two days prior. 
Allowing for the one day of delay between the report and the arrest, we conclude that a lapse of two to three days after 
the injurious event – while the temporary bruising from the injurious event is still observable – unquestionably qualifies 
as a “recent” physical injury under Section 2711(a). To be sure, Section 2711(a) specifically authorizes the warrantless 
arrest of perpetrators of domestic violence. By using such a vague term as “recent” in Section 2711(a), the legislature 
apparently realized that victims of domestic violence might delay reporting abuse “because they [might] believe it is a 
private matter or for fear that the violence would intensify” and that there might be some delay between the report and 
the police action. See S.K.C. v. J.L.C., 94 A.3d 402, 415 n.17 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“[m]ore often than not, female domestic 
violence victims do not report the abuse because they believe it is a private matter or for fear that the violence would 
intensify”), quoting, Christina Samons, Same–Sex Domestic Violence: The Need for Affirmative Legal Protections at All 
Levels of Government, 22 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 417, 420 (2013) (citation omitted). In such context, a delay of 
two to three days from the injurious event undoubtedly qualifies as “recent.” C.f. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6303 (defining “recent 
act” under the Child Protective Services Law as: “[a]ny act committed within two years of the date of the report to the 
department or county agency”). Appellant’s claim on appeal thus fails.” 
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